Economics of Organizations and Markets
Sander Onderstal
09-01-2023
| Boek | E-Book | |
| ISBN | 9789043040815 | 9789043040877 |
| Soort | Paperback | Online |
| Toegang | 2 jaar | 2 jaar |
| Prijs | € 61,50 (incl. btw) | € 41,50 (incl. btw) |
| Boek | E-Book | |
| ISBN | 9789043040815 | 9789043040877 |
| Soort | Paperback | Online |
| Toegang | 2 jaar | 2 jaar |
| Prijs | € 61,50 (incl. btw) | € 41,50 (incl. btw) |
Economics of organizations and markets combines insights from two fields in Economics: Organizational Economics and Industrial Economics. Organizational Economics focuses on the organizational design of firms, which includes a firm’s motivation of its personnel, its hiring and firing policy and make or buy decisions. Industrial Organization considers the interaction of firms in markets, including their decisions with respect to price, quantity, quality, product positioning and advertising.
The book consists of six parts. Each part is divided into three chapters and starts with a chapter devoted to game theoretical techniques. The other two chapters of the part will examine applications to Organizational Economics and Industrial Economics respectively. Each chapter in the book contains a case study, which helps the reader to understand the practical side of the game theory analysis. It also motivates the student to take a step further by presenting the results of the empirical tests established in the chapter. This indicates both the strengths and the limits of game theory.
Students at university in the second or third bachelor year in the fields of Economics and Business Economics.
Part I: Introduction
H1 Organizations and efficiency
H2 Organizational Economics
H3 Industrial Organization
Part II: Strategic interaction
H4 Game theory
H5 Team incentives
H6 Oligopoly
Part III: Dynamic interaction
H7 Dynamic games
H8 Optimal incentive contracts
H9 Market entry and product positioning
Part IV: Repeated interaction
H10 Repeated interaction and the value of revenge
H11 Relational contracts
H12 Collusion in markets
Part V: Information asymmetry
H13 Games with asymmetric information
H14 Hiring and firing
H15 Price discrimination
Part VI: Commitment
H16 The value of commitment
H17 Make or buy
H18 Predation
Sander Onderstal is a professor at the Universiteit van Amsterdam, department of Economics.
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