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Condorcet Voting Paradox
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Condorcet Voting Paradox
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17. Asymmetric Information, Voting, and Public Choice / Condorcet Voting Paradox / Problem 6
Problem 6
In a scenario where A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A, what outcome can be predicted if the voting agenda is A vs B followed by C vs A?
A
C will win.
B
B will win.
C
A will win.
D
The outcome is unpredictable.
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